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Summary
The way that we interpret and interact with the world entails
making decisions on the basis of available sensory evi-
dence. Recent primate neurophysiology [1–6], human neu-
roimaging [7–13], and modeling experiments [14–19] have
demonstrated that perceptual decisions are based on an
integrative process in which sensory evidence accumulates
over time until an internal decision bound is reached. Here
we used repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation
(rTMS) to provide causal support for the role of the dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in this integrative process.
Specifically, we used a speeded perceptual categorization
task designed to induce a time-dependent accumulation of
sensory evidence through rapidly updating dynamic stimuli
and found that disruption of the left DLPFC with low-
frequency rTMS reduced accuracy and increased response
times relative to a sham condition. Importantly, using the
drift-diffusion model, we show that these behavioral effects
correspond to a decrease in drift rate, a parameter de-
scribing the rate and thereby the efficiency of the sensory
evidence integration in the decision process. These results
provide causal evidence linking the DLPFC to the mecha-
nism of evidence accumulation during perceptual decision
making.
Results and Discussion
Perceptual decision making is the process of choosing one
option or course of action from a set of alternatives based on
information gathered from sensory systems. This process is
often modeled as a temporal accumulation of sensory evi-
dence to an internal decision threshold, which marks the
commitment to a particular choice. Single-cell recordings in
primates have identified this kind of accumulating activity
in a distributed network of brain areas including the parietal
and prefrontal cortices as well as the brain stem [2, 5, 6, 20,
21]. Similarly, results of human neuroimaging studies suggest
that the integration of sensory evidence might involve regions
of the parietal and prefrontal cortex [8, 9, 13, 22]. Despite the*Correspondence: marios.philiastides@gmail.comimportance of these findings in advancing our understanding
of the neural correlates of perceptual decision making, human
studies have not yet provided causal evidence linking these
candidate areas directly to the mechanism of evidence
accumulation.
Themajor limiting factor in establishing this link has been the
correlational nature of most neuroimaging methods, which
provide no causal (i.e., interventional) evidence for the func-
tional contribution of activated brain regions to a particular
task or underlying neuronal process. Similar to electrical
microstimulation in primates [23, 24], transcranial magnetic
stimulation (TMS) in humans has the potential to circumvent
this limitation. Here, we capitalize on this technique and intro-
duce a novel approach that combines repetitive TMS (rTMS)
and computational modeling to help establish the missing
causal link between prefrontal cortex and the process of
evidence accumulation during human perceptual decision
making.
On the one hand, low-frequency rTMS can transiently
disrupt the function of an area by depressing cortical excit-
ability, potentially leading to quantifiable behavioral conse-
quences [25–27]. Mathematical models, on the other hand,
can characterize the computational principles underlying the
cognitive process under investigation by defining internal vari-
ables that instantiate these computations. By combining the
two approaches, one could ultimately describe the behavioral
effects resulting from rTMS in terms of the model’s internal
variables, thereby providing a direct link between the stimu-
lated area and the function ascribed to these variables.
We adopted this approach to study the involvement of the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) during perceptual deci-
sion making using a task explicitly designed to induce a
temporal integration of sensory information (see below). We
chose the target site based on previous reports by Heekeren
and colleagues [8, 9], who suggested that a region in the left
posterior DLPFC might integrate the incoming sensory
evidence, independent of stimulus and response modalities.
We hypothesize that for this region to be causally linked to
the process of evidence accumulation, rTMS applied to this
area should hinder behavioral performance relative to a
sham condition. Moreover, when modeled with the drift-diffu-
sion model (DDM) for simple decision making (a well-estab-
lished model in cognitive psychology [12, 17, 28]), these
behavioral effects should be explained primarily by changes
in drift rate, a model’s internal variable that quantifies the
rate, and hence the efficiency, of sensory evidence integration.
For each of 12 well-trained participants, we applied two
separate 12 min rTMS sessions: a 1 Hz low-frequency rTMS
to the left DLPFC (Montreal Neurological Institute coordinates:
222, 26, 36; Figure 1A) and a 12 min sham rTMS over the same
area. After each rTMS session, participants completed four
trial blocks, each lasting around 5 min, of a speeded percep-
tual categorization task (Figure 1B). Specifically, we used
a face-versus-car categorization task designed to induce a
time-dependent accumulation of sensory evidence based on
concrete perceptual categories through rapidly updating dy-
namic stimuli. We used two levels of sensory evidence (high
and low). Participants indicated their choice via a button press
BA
Figure 1. rTMS Target Site and Behavioral Task
(A) A region within the superior frontal sulcus, in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (MNI coordinates: 222, 26, 36; red circle), as reported previously by
Heekeren and colleagues [8, 9] using functional magnetic resonance imaging experiments.
(B) Schematic representation of the behavioral task. See Supplemental Experimental Procedures for more details.
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981as soon as they had formed a decision. To account for poten-
tial confounding effects of learning, we counterbalanced the
order of rTMS and sham sessions across participants (see
Supplemental Results available online for more details).
Importantly, the presence of multiple trial blocks per session
served as an additional control because we anticipated poten-
tial rTMS effects to dissipate over time (i.e., during the second
half of trials) [29, 30]. Therefore, for all analyses we split the
trials into a first half (i.e., the first two trial blocks) versus
a second half (third and fourth blocks).
First, we looked at the overall behavioral effects (accuracy
and mean reaction times). As expected, we found a significant
main effect of sensory evidence on both the accuracy and
mean reaction time. Specifically, there was an increase in
accuracy and a decrease in mean reaction time in the high-
relative to the low-stimulus sensory evidence condition for
both the first (F1,10 = 103.26, p < 1 3 10
24 and F1,10 = 99.823,A B
C D
Figure 2. Behavioral Performance
Mean accuracy (A and B) and mean response time (RT) (C and D) across
participants for the two levels of sensory evidence (L, low; H, high) and for
each of the rTMS and sham conditions, separately for the first (A and C)
and second half (B and D) of trials. Error bars represent standard error of
the mean.p < 1 3 1024, respectively; Figures 2A and 2C) and second
half of trials (F1,10 = 36.662, p < 1 3 10
24 and F1,10 = 218.889,
p < 1 3 1024, respectively; Figures 2B and 2D). Additionally,
note that there was a trend for an overall increase in mean
response time as a function of time (i.e., Figures 2C and 2D),
possibly as a result of participant fatigue in the course of
each session (see Supplemental Results).
Crucially, in keeping with the main focus of our study, we
also found a main effect of TMS on behavior for the first but
not the second half of trials. Specifically, immediately after
rTMS was administered to the left DLPFC (i.e., during the first
half of trials), accuracy was significantly reduced (F1,10 = 6.326,
p = 0.0306) and mean response times were significantly
increased (F1,10 = 6.474, p = 0.0291) relative to the sham condi-
tion (Figures 2A and 2C). There was no significant interaction
between TMS and the level of sensory evidence in either
accuracy or response time (F1,10 = 0.382, p = 0.5503 and
F1,10 = 0.329, p = 0.5792, respectively), suggesting that rTMS
affected performance similarly across our two stimulus diffi-
culty levels (but see Supplemental Results). These behavioral
effects were no longer present in the second half of trials
(F1,10 = 0.849, p = 0.3785 and F1,10 = 0.816, p = 0.3876, respec-
tively; Figures 2B and 2D), confirming our original hypothesis
that the rTMS effects would dissipate over time [29, 30].
Next, we fit the DDM [12, 17, 28] to the behavioral data from
individual participants, separately for the first and second half
of trials in each of the rTMS and sham sessions (see Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures). In short, the DDM assumes
a stochastic accumulation of sensory evidence over time, from
a starting point to one of two decision boundaries correspond-
ing to the two choices. The model decomposes accuracy and
response times into components of processing that reflect the
rate of evidence accumulation (drift rate), the amount of
evidence required to make a decision (starting point and deci-
sion boundaries), and the duration of nondecision processes
(nondecision time), such as early stimulus encoding and
response production along with the variance in each of the
components of processing.
Our DDM results revealed that drift rate and nondecision
time were the two parameters that systematically varied
across experimental conditions for all of our subjects (see
Supplemental Experimental Procedures and Tables S1 and
S2). In line with what we have reported previously [12, 18],
there was amain effect of the level of sensory evidence on drift
rate, such that drift rate was higher for high relative to the low
sensory evidence condition, for both the first and second half
A B
C D
Figure 3. Diffusion Model Parameter Estimates
Mean drift rate (A and B) and mean nondecision time across participants
for the two levels of sensory evidence (L, low; H, high) (C and D) and for
each of the rTMS and sham conditions, separately for the first (A and C)
and second half (B and D) of trials. Error bars represent standard error of
the mean. See also Figures S1 and S2 to visualize the overall quality of
the drift-diffusion model fits.
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982of trials (F1,10 = 54.482, p < 1 3 10
24 and F1,10 = 20.324, p =
0.0011, respectively; Figures 3A and 3B), confirming that
evidence accumulation is faster and more efficient for easier
than harder trials. There was also a main effect of sensory
evidence on nondecision time such that nondecision time
was shorter for high relative to the low sensory evidence
condition, for both the first and second half of trials (F1,10 =
16.168, p = 0.0024 and F1,10 = 24.350, p = 0.0006, respectively;
Figures 3C and 3D), suggesting that early stimulus encoding
was faster for easier (i.e., high-evidence) trials.
Central to our study, we also found a main effect of TMS
on drift rate for the first but not the second half of trials. Specif-
ically, immediately after rTMS was administered to the left
DLPFC (i.e., the first half of trials), the drift ratewas significantly
reduced relative to the sham condition (F1,10 = 6.296, p = 0.031;
Figure 3A). There was no significant interaction between TMS
and level of sensory evidence (F1,10 = 0.929, p = 0.3578). As ex-
pected, the TMS effects were eliminated in the second half of
trials (F1,10 = 0.637, p = 0.4434; Figure 3B). Importantly, no cor-
responding differences were found for nondecision time for
either the first or the second half of trials (F1,10 = 0.344, p =
0.5702 and F1,10 = 3.226, p = 0.1, respectively; Figures 3C
and 3D), indicating that behavioral effects resulting from
rTMS are exclusively captured by changes in drift rate. These
findings were additionally confirmed by a fully flexible fitting
procedure on the DDM parameters (Supplemental Experi-
mental Procedures).
One important consideration is whether our results might
reflect a disturbance of top-down attentional control on
sensory systems or of semantic processing, as opposed to a
direct influence on decision making, because DLPFC has
also been implicated in these processes [31–34]. Importantly,
reduced top-down influence of attention on sensory cortexas a result of rTMS would have prolonged the early encoding
of the stimulus, which in turn would have resulted in increased
nondecision times [35] in the TMS relative to the sham condi-
tion. Crucially, there were no significant differences in nonde-
cision times between TMS and sham in our task (Figure 3C).
Additionally, there are clear anatomical and functional dissoci-
ations between the region of the left DLPFC that we targeted
here and those involved in attentional control [31, 34, 36–38]
and semantic processing [32, 33, 39, 40] (see Supplemental
Results and Supplemental Discussion for more details). Taken
together, these results render a purely attentional or semantic
account of our effects unlikely.
The ultimate goal of research on human decision making is
to provide a comprehensive account of the networks involved
in this process. An interesting question for future work is
whether altering activity of other regions (e.g., in parietal
cortex) might also influence the decision process and, if so,
whether these other areas interact with DLPFC to give rise to
some of the observed effects. Similarly, one would need to
address whether DLPFC is directly involved in computing the
integration of the incoming evidence or whether it merely
reflects the output of this computation. Despite these caveats,
however, our rTMS-induced effects provide strong evidence
for a causal role of the left DLPFC in affecting how efficiently
the accumulated evidence is represented and ultimately
used to make a decision. Combining TMS with neuroimaging
might provide a good conduit to addressing these open
questions [41–43].
In conclusion, our results show that decision-making mech-
anisms, inter alia, can be traced and studied in left DLPFC.
More specifically, they demonstrate that for nominally iden-
tical stimuli, transient inhibition of the left DLPFC hampers,
explicitly, the rate and ultimately the efficiency with which
sensory evidence is integrated. As such, these findings
provide the first causal evidence linking left DLPFC to the
mechanism of evidence accumulation during perceptual
decision making in humans. Importantly, these results were
afforded by our model-based TMS approach, which, as we
demonstrated here, has the potential to become a powerful
tool in cognitive neuroscience.Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Results, Supplemental
Discussion, Supplemental Experimental Procedures, two tables, and two
figures and can be found with this article online at doi:10.1016/j.cub.2011.
04.034.
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